Lost in translation? Gender Reassignment Surgery in Financial Remedy Proceedings is making Headlines in the Media for all the wrong reasons.
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LOST IN TRANSLATION? Gender Reassignment Surgery in Financial Remedy Proceedings is making Headlines in the Media for all the wrong reasons.
“TRANS ROW: Divorced mum ordered to pay her ex-husband half the £160,000 cost of his trans surgery in legal first.” So read The Sun’s headline on 13 July 2025. What is the real story, the truth behind the headlines?
The impact of the costs of gender reassignment surgery (GRS) was only one of four issues discussed within the 120 paragraphs of the JY v KF [2025] EWFC 195 (B) judgment of HHJ Farquhar. And yet, it was handpicked to form the main highlight of The Sun Newspaper’s article. As this commentary will show, this article serves as a prime example of the dangers of the mainstream media taking snippets from cases which align with current and popular political discussions, twisting them to suit their own narrative for the sole purpose of clicks on their site. But this practice has harmful and far wider repercussions on the public. Riddled with inconsistencies, this article is one of many that reinforce false conceptions, leaving readers misinformed on the law in an area that arguably matters to all the most: family.
Initially, the headline implies that the primary issue in this case was the cost of the GRS for the Respondent. Having read it, it becomes clear that this issue forms only one of four discussed throughout the judgment. In summary, and dealing with the distribution of assets worth just over £3 million, HHJ Farquhar concluded the following:
1) The hotel ran by the Applicant was not producing a substantial profit that amounted to a consistent income for the Applicant (which the Respondent had professed was the case), justifying the previous order for periodical maintenance payments to the Applicant;
2) The GRS costs for the Respondent paid for jointly from matrimonial assets was reasonable, qualifying the surgery as a health need and therefore medical care which is typically paid for out of joint funds;
3) The order made in 2023 for periodical payments of £96,000 (£6,000pm) and other costs (including hearings) totalling £127,340.71 was justified after consideration of the Respondent’s income; and
4) Liabilities in large sum were “soft loans” and not required to be included in the distribution of assets.
It is also worth noting that both the children in this case were aged over 18 years of age, with the use of emotive language by The Sun in the form of “child support” not only being an inaccuracy but also inappropriate. Whilst both children were dependent on their parents financially – with one attending university and the other on their gap year beforehand – it is wrong for the paper to label the periodical payments ordered to the Applicant as “child support” with the maintenance intended to cover the living expenses of the Applicant and their two children in the form of regular periodical maintenance payments. Again, focusing on a single aspect of the order, the article failed to mention the other costs which it comprised of.
Further on into this short article, it mentions that the “cost of his transition” was split between the parties which is yet another inconsistency. In the case, the dispute was exclusively regarding the cost of the GRS and not the entirety of the transition itself. The article continues to reduce the reasoning of the court to cherry picked words from the judgment, stating that the court’s decision about the costs was “reasonable” because it was a “need” not a “whim.” Unsurprisingly, HHJ Farquhar’s reasoning is much more elaborate, despite this issue only being covered in paragraphs [35]-[52]. Within these paragraphs, HHJ Farquhar conducts a needs assessment, relying on needs being a broad concept (White v White [2000] UKHL 54 at [36] (Lord Nicholls)) to conclude that GRS falls under health needs, evidenced through the numerous doctors’ letters supplied by the Respondent. Further, whilst the GRS is not a relationship-generated cost, medical costs are typically covered from joint resources. Ultimately, the GRS was a “genuine and deep felt medical/psychological need” ([52]) and subsequently equates to being treated the same way as medical costs would. In his assessment, HHJ Farquhar also considered whether the applicant had any similar needs, thereby reinforcing the balancing exercise undertaken by the courts, underpinned by fairness and objectivity for the parties involved. Despite all this, the article appears to cling onto the Applicant’s argument against the joint use of funds: that it was the Respondent’s sole choice and ought to be paid for by them only and the relevance of the Applicant’s unawareness of the Respondent’s gender identity until the end of their marriage. This was readily dismissed by HHJ Farquhar, since these fall under matters of conduct which are rarely relevant, if at all, to distribution of financial assets.
Having briefly mentioned the irrelevance of conduct in financial proceedings, The Sun’s persistent focus on the parties’ behaviour emphasises the false conception that conduct still forms a part of these matters. However, in an attempt to make these proceedings less strenuous for parties involved, it is clear that s25(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 places a high threshold to surpass for conduct to be considered relevant to financial distribution of assets as explained in the judgment ([80]-[86]).
Ultimately, HHJ Farquhar concluded that the assets were to be distributed 54.7/45.3 to the Applicant and the Respondent respectively. Additionally, he noted the importance of a clean break between the parties, given their significant mistrust of one another financially. Demonstrated in this short commentary, The Sun newspaper’s account of JY v KF [2025] EWFC 195 (B) fails to provide an accurate and comprehensive overview for the reader, tainting their perspective of this aspect of family law with harmful scepticism and mistrust of the family justice system emerging from reinforcement of significant misconceptions.
Our key contacts at DMP for further advice and assistance on divorce and family law issues are Stephanie Alderwick and Tony Roe:
stephanie.alderwick@dextermontague.co.uk
Telephone 0118 939399.
The contents of this article are for the purposes of general awareness only. They do not purport to constitute legal or professional advice. The law may have changed since this article was published. Readers should not act on the basis of the information included and should take appropriate professional advice upon their own particular circumstances.
Amelia Disbray
University of Reading
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